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I. INTRODUCTION
When a husband and wife file a joint income tax return each is
generally jointly and severally liable for the tax.' A primary policy
reason for such joint and several liability is administrative conven-
ience.2 Although the rationale for imposing joint and several liability
* Member, Arnold & Lax, a Professional Association, Little Rock, Arkansas; B.S.B.A.,
University of Arkansas (1980); J.D., University of Arkansas (1983); LL.M., University of
Florida (1989).
1. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1986) provides, in pertinent part: "[I1fajoint return is made, the
tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be
joint and several." Joint and several liability also exists with respect to penalties and additions
to tax: e.g., the 50% fraud penalty determined to be due as a result of the fraud of either
spouse. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The requirements for when a hus-
band and wife may file a joint return are set forth in I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1986).
2. Since a joint return does not show the respective incomes and deductions of a husband
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where a joint return isc filed has been questioned,3 it is firmly en-
trenched in both statutory and judicial law.4
The primary goal of this article is to provide a critical analysis of
section 6013(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the cases
interpreting and applying this statute as it has evolved through the
years. This provision sets forth the circumstances under which an
individual who signs a joint return with his or her spouse may be
relieved of liability for tax by qualifying as an "innocent spouse."
Although the statute sets forth specific requirements that must be sat-
isfied before innocent spouse relief will be granted, this article will
address the arbitrariness of the limitations of this provision and ques-
tion the purpose of these restrictions.' This article will further note
that although the courts have articulated standards to help taxpayers
apply this statute to their particular situation,6 these standards have
been so inconsistently applied that any certainty as to the applicability
of this provision today is questionable.7 The article also will review
the recent changes made by the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988 and comment on what impact this legislation has on the
continued viability of I.R.C. section 6013(e) today.8 Further, the arti-
cle will propose modifications for reform of existing law9 and offer
planning suggestions for advising clients in view of current law.'0 In
the final analysis, the underlying theme will be to form an opinion
about whether the provision actually serves its purpose of providing
relief to deserving innocent spouses or whether it is ladened with so
many problems that it should be deposited in the nearest "dipsy
dumpster."
II. PURPOSE AND ANALYSIS OF STATUTE
A. Legislative History and Changes
Prior to 1971 there was no provision in the Internal Revenue
and wife, and since the statute imposes a tax on the aggregate income, administrative simplic-
ity makes it necessary that the filing of such a return create a liability that is joint and several.
H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
3. See Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief: A Call for Legislative and Judicial Liberalization,
40 TAX LAW. 819 (1987).
4. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1986); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
5. See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 104-69 and accompanying text.
8. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6004, 102
Stat. 3685 (1988). See also infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text,
9. See infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 184-213 and accompanying text.
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Code to ameliorate the harsh effects of joint liability where the acts of
one spouse, unknown to the other, resulted in an increased joint and
several tax liability.' Several instances in which joint liability was
asserted by the Internal Revenue Service in similar circumstances re-
sulted in court decisions. Although courts expressed sympathy for
the innocent spouse, they stated that the clear role of the statute, im-
posing joint and several liability, did not permit any decision other
than the one holding the innocent spouse liable for the taxes and
penalties. 12
In 1971 section 6013(e) was enacted by Congress to relieve an
"innocent spouse" from joint liability to the extent the tax liability
was attributable to an omission from gross income by the other
spouse. '3 As originally enacted, taxpayers had to satisfy the following
11. A typical situation might be one in which a husband embezzles funds (which are
taxable income) and omits the proceeds from gross income. If the wife of the embezzler filed a
joint return with her husband for the year in which the income should have been reported, the
Internal Revenue Service could, under then existing law, hold the innocent spouse liable for
the tax liability resulting from the underpayment and for the 50% fraud penalty due as a result
of the fraudulent omission of the embezzled funds from income. This liability could be im-
posed upon the spouse even though she had no knowledge of her husband's activities and the
resulting omission from income, and did not benefit in any way from the use of the funds.
H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970). Some of the judicial decisions
carried pleas for legislative relief. See, e.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967). In
Scudder the court observed:
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and are ap-
palled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the inflexible statute leaves
no room for amelioration. It would seem that only remedial legislation can soften
the impact of the rule of strict individual liability for income taxes on the many
married women who are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by filing joint
returns.
Id. at 41.
13. Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063 (1971) states:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 (relating to joint returns of income tax by husband and wife) is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
-(e) SPOUSE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES.-
"(1) IN GENERAL-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate, if-
-(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable year
and on such return there was omitted from gross income an amount prop-
erly includable therein which is attributable to one spouse and which is in
excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return,
"(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she
did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission, and
"(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse significantly
benefited directly or indirectly from the items omitted from gross income
and taking into account all other facts and circumstances, it is inequitable
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three conditions to qualify for relief from joint tax liability (including
interest, penalties, and other amounts): (1) a joint return had to be
filed from which there was an omission from gross income attributa-
ble to one spouse amounting to more than twenty-five percent of the
total gross income stated on the return; (2) the innocent spouse had to
establish that in signing the return he or she did not know of, and had
no reason to know of, the omission from income; and (3) taking into
account whether or not the spouse significantly benefitted from the
items omitted from gross income and all other facts and circum-
stances, it would be inequitable to hold the spouse in question liable
for the deficiency in tax.' 4
Although the enactment of this provision was certainly a step in
the right direction, the original statute fell short of fully achieving its
remedial purpose. It failed to provide relief to an innocent spouse
where the assessment of a deficiency was based upon the disallowance
of deductions claimed under circumstances similar to which relief
under section 6013(e) would otherwise be granted.' 5 For example, in
Ketchum v. Commissioner 16 innocent spouse relief was denied where
the deficiency resulted from the Commissioner's disallowance of de-
ductions taken by the husband.' 7 While acknowledging that the wife
was the victim of her ex-husband's irresponsible conduct, the court
relied on the legislative history of the statute in reluctantly determin-
ing that she could not qualify under the innocent spouse provision
because the statute did not extend relief to overstated deductions, but
to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year
attributable to such omission,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penal-
ties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is
attributable to such omission from gross income.
"(2) SPECIAL RULES.-for purposes of paragraph (1)-
"(A) the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross income
(other than gross income from property) are attributable shall be made
without regard to community property laws, and
"(B) the amount omitted from gross income shall be determined in
the manner provided by section 6501(e)(1)(A)."
14. I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
This provision applies to an omission from gross income for any reason and is not limited to
embezzlement, theft or similar activities. See also Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th
Cir. 1975). This provision was adopted to prevent hardships which resulted when one spouse
did not report income, thereby leaving the "innocent spouse" to pay the deficiencies. Id. at
166.
15. See Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Panny and Faust,
The Innocent Spouse Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: In Search of Equity, 32 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 137 (1977).
16. 697 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1982).
17. Id. at 468.
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rather only omissions from income.'
8
The original statute also failed to provide relief where the omis-
sion from gross income fell short of the required twenty-five percent
benchmark,' 9 even though all other statutory requirements were satis-
fied. Strict interpretation of the statute has led to some very harsh
results. 20 Commentators have criticized this approach,2' particularly
in view of the underlying policy of this legislation.2 2 The courts, how-
ever, have been mindful of the underlying policy for allowing the fil-
ing of joint returns, 23 and have looked to Congress for reform.
24
In 1984 Congress significantly broadened section 6013(e) to pro-
vide relief to an innocent spouse for "grossly erroneous items" result-
ing in a "substantial understatement" of tax attributable to the other
18. Id. This provision grants relief from the imposition upon innocent spouses of large
liabilities for taxes and penalties attributable to income omitted from a joint return by the
other spouse. S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6089, 6090. When Congress enacted the innocent spouse provision in
1971, it restricted the provision's applicability to omissions that are greater than 25% of gross
income to insure that this special relief would extend only "to those cases where the income
omitted represents a significant amount relative to the reported income." Id. at 6091.
19. See Panny and Faust, supra note 15, at 158.
20. See Fields v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,652 (1981), where the taxpayer
argued that the court should round the 24.96% omission from gross income up to the 25%
threshold so that taxpayer could avail himself of innocent spouse relief. The court rejected
taxpayer's argument stating "[N]either the statute, case law, nor any sound reasoning we can
think of calls for such a result. Accordingly, the taxpayer is not entitled to relief as an inno-
cent spouse under § 6013(e)." Id.
21. See Emory, New Law Alleviates Innocent Spouse-Joint Return Problem on Omitted
Income, 34 J. TAX'N 154 (1971); Zahn, The Innocent Spouse Rule, 58 A.B.A.J. 1228 (1972).
22. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975). "Congress intended the
[innocent spouse] exception to remedy a perceived injustice, and we should not hinder that
praiseworthy intent by giving the exception an unduly narrow or restrictive reading." Id. at
166-67.
23. See Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971) where the court stated:
It is important that these provisions be kept in proper perspective. The filing of a
joint return is a highly valuable privilege to husband and wife since the resulting tax
liability is generally substantially less than the combined taxes that would be due
from both spouses if they had filed separate returns. The circumstances give particu-
lar emphasis to the statutory rule that the liability with respect to tax is joint and
several, regardless of the source of income or of the fact that one spouse may be less
informed about the contents of the return than the other, for both spouses ordinarily
benefit from the reduction in tax that ensues by reason of the joint return. * * * But
it must be kept in mind that Congress still regards joint and several liability as an
important adjunct to the privilege of filing joint returns, and that if there is to be any
relaxation of that rule the taxpayer must comply with the carefully detailed condi-
tions set forth in section 6013(e).
Id. at 380-81. See also Gorman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,344 (1986); Wayne
Johnson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,569 (1980).
24. See Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967).
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spouse. 25  A substantial understatement of tax means "any under-
25. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 494, 801-03
(1984) states:
SEC. 424. INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY IN CERTAIN
CASES.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-Subsection (e) of section 6013 (relating to spouse re-
lieved of liability in certain cases) is amended to read as follows:
"(e) SPOUSE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES.
"(1) IN GENERAL-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
"(A) a joint return has been made under this section for the taxable
year,
"(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax attrib-
utable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse,
"(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she
did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such substantial
understatement, and,
"(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequita-
ble to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable
year attributable to such substantial understatement,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest,
penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is
attributable to such substantial understatement.
"(2) GROSSLY ERRONEOUS ITEMS.-For purposes of this subsection, the
term 'grossly erroneous items' means, with respect to any spouse-
"(A) any item of gross income attributable to such spouse which is
omitted from gross income, and
"(B) any claim of a deduction, credit, or basis by such spouse in an
amount for which there is no basis in fact or law.
"(3) SUBSTANTIAL UNDERSTATEMENT.-For purposes of this subsection,
the term 'substantial understatement' means any understatement (as defined in
section 6661(b)(2)(A)) which exceeds $500.
"(4) UNDERSTATEMENT MUST EXCEED SPECIFIED PERCENTAGE OF
SPOUSE'S INCOME.-
"(A) Adjusted Gross Income of $20,000 or Less.-If the spouse's ad-
justed gross income for the preadjustment year is $20,000 or less, this sub-
section shall apply only if the liability described in paragraph (1) is greater
than 10 percent of such adjusted gross income.
"(B) Adjusted Gross Income of More Than $20,000.-If the spouse's
adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year is more than $20,000,
subparagraph (A) shall be applied by substituting '25 percent' for '10 per-
cent'.
"(C) Preadjustment Year.-For purposes of this paragraph, the term
'preadjustment year' means the most recent taxable year of the spouse end-
ing before the date the deficiency notice is mailed.
"(D) Computation of Spouse's Adjusted Gross Income.-If the
spouse is married to another spouse at the close of the preadjustment year,
the spouse's adjusted gross income shall include the income of the new
spouse (whether or not they file a joint return).
"(E) Exception for Omissions from Gross Income.-This paragraph
shall not apply to any liability attributable to the omission of an item from
gross income.
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statement ... which exceeds $500. ' '26 Basically, "grossly erroneous
items" include any items of income that are omitted from gross in-
come, regardless of the basis for the omission.27 Additionally,
"grossly erroneous items" include "any claim of a deduction, credit,
or basis by such other spouse in an amount for which there is no basis
in fact or law."2 8 Although the statute does not define "no basis in
fact or law," the committee report 29 as well as the courts 30 have pro-
vided some guidance in interpreting this language.
In Douglas v. Commissioner3 1 the court reviewed the statute and
its legislative history, and held that a deduction has no basis in fact
when the expense for which the deduction is claimed was never in fact
made. The court further held that "[a] deduction has no basis in law
when the expense, even if made, does not qualify as a deductible ex-
pense under well-settled legal principles or when no substantial legal
"(5) SPECIAL RULE FOR COMMUNITY PROPERTY INCOME.-For pur-
poses of this subsection, the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attributable shall be made
without regard to community property laws."
(c) EFFECTIVE DATES.-
(1) In General.-Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendments
made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to all taxable years to which the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies. Corresponding provisions shall be
deemed to be included in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and shall apply to
all taxable years to which such Code applies.
26. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., pt. 2, at 1502,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1143.
27. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A) (1986). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH
CONG., IST SESS., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 3475: TAX LAW SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVE-
MENT ACT OF 1983 18 (Comm. Print, July 22, 1983) (prepared for Ways and Means Commit-
tee hearing, July 25, 1983). The legislative history and the statute itself specifically provide
that any understatement of tax attributable to omitted income is considered grossly erroneous.
28. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1986).
29. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., pt. 2, at 1502, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1143.
The committee believes that the present law rules relieving innocent spouses from
liability for tax on a joint return are not sufficiently broad to encompass many cases
where the innocent spouse deserves relief. Relief may be desirable, for example,
where one spouse claims phony business deductions in order to avoid paying tax and
the other spouse has no reason to know that the deductions are phony and may be
unaware that there are untaxed profits from the business which the other spouse has
squandered.
Id.
30. See Shenker v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986); Douglas v. Commis-
sioner, 86 T.C. 758 (1986); Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228 (1986); Neary v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,261 (1985).
31. 86 T.C. 758 (1986).
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argument can be made to support its deductibility. 3 2
Two other significant changes made by the 1984 Tax Reform Act
severely limit the availability of innocent spouse relief where the un-
derstatement of tax is attributable to grossly erroneous items of the
other spouse. First, such relief is only available where the amount of
tax liability in issue exceeds a specified percentage of the innocent
spouse's adjusted gross income.33 This percentage varies depending
on the amount of the adjusted gross income of the individual claiming
innocent spouse relief.34 Second, the adjusted gross income of the in-
nocent spouse includes the income of such individual's spouse, if any,
for the most recent taxable year ending before the date the deficiency
notice is mailed. 35 The most incredible part of this second limitation
is that it requires inclusion of each spouse's income, even if a joint
return is not filed.36
Another change made by the 1984 amendments was the elimina-
tion of the specific statutory inquiry into whether the innocent spouse
benefitted from the omission.37 The primary focus of this provision
today is whether imposing the tax would be inequitable under all the
facts and circumstances. 38  Although this change in the statute ap-
peared to be a significant one, its practical effect involved nothing
more than a different phraseology of the same analysis.39
Even though the amendments made by the 1984 Tax Reform
Act' denote some liberalization of the innocent spouse provisions,
the application of the statute by the courts reveals a need for further
legislative reform.41
32. Id. at 763. See also Shenker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,301 (1985),
where the court held that ordinarily, a deduction having no basis in fact or in law can be
described as frivolous, fraudulent, or to use the word of the committee report, phony.
33. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
34. Id.
35. See Borison, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1986). See supra note 13 for the text of the statute prior to
amendment by Pub. L. No. 98-369.
38. Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986). See supra note 25.
39. See infra notes 76-77 and 87-88 and accompanying text.
40. Section 6013(e) was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369,
Sec. 424(a), 98 Stat. 801, with retroactive application to all taxable years to which the I.R.C. of
1954 and 1939 applies. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., pt. 2, at 1503, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1144.
41. Borison, supra note 3. Although there were further amendments made by the Techni-
cal and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, as will be seen infra at notes 169-74 and accompa-
nying text, these changes failed to achieve the necessary legislative reform.
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B. Analysis and Application of Section 6013(e)
A taxpayer seeking protection under the innocent spouse um-
brella bears the burden of proving that each provision of section
6013(e)(1) is satisfied before relief will be granted.42
First, the statute requires that the taxpayer file a joint return for
the taxable year in question.43 The intention of the parties to file a
joint return is a question of fact, 4 and in many of the reported deci-
sions this first requirement is frequently stipulated as having been
met.45
The second requirement is that the joint return reflect a substan-
tial understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of
one spouse.16 For reasons that will become apparent below, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the two types of grossly erroneous
items set forth in the statute: (1) omissions from gross income,47 and
(2) claims of improper deductions, credits, or basis.4"
If the understatement of tax is due to an omission of items from
gross income, section 6013(e) relieves the innocent spouse of liability
regardless of how great a percentage of gross income the omission
represents, 49 as long as the resulting understatement of tax5" exceeds
five hundred dollars and the other statutory prerequisites are met.
This is a more liberal expansion of the original statute,5' and is consis-
tent with its remedial purpose.5 2 Although there has been some litiga-
tion over what is an omission from gross income for purposes of
42. Ratana v. Commissioner, 662 F.2d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 1981); Estate of Jackson v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356 (1979); Wayne Johnson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H)
80,569 (1980); Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973); Sonnenborn v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 373, 381 (1971).
43. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A) (1986).
44. Cecere v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,371 (1975); Estate of Campbell v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971).
45. Enterline v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,200 (1980); Feingold v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,163 (1980).
46. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (1986). For the basic concepts of this requirement, see supra
notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
47. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(A) (1986).
48. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1986).
49. Farmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1986).
50. See supra note 26. See also Moskovitz v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357
(1986), in which the court stated that -[i]n order to be relieved of liability, there must be a
'substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of one spouse.' " Id.
at 86 (quoting I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(B) (1986)).
51. Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986); Moskovitz v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357 (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., pt.
2, at 1502-03, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1143-44.
52. Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1975).
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applying the innocent spouse provision, 3 this is not an issue that is
frequently disputed today.
Prior to the 1984 amendments, section 6013(e) provided no relief
where the understatement of tax was attributable to claimed deduc-
tions. With the 1984 amendments, Congress extended the term
"grossly erroneous items" to claims of deductions, credits, or basis for
which there is no basis in law or fact which give rise to a substantial
understatement of taxable income.54 Although there has been some
litigation over the meaning of "no basis in law or fact," 55 and one
leading commentator has criticized the use of this standard,5 6 the ma-
jority of the controversy surrounding section 6013(e) involves the last
two requirements of the statute.
When the assessed deficiency results from a claim of an improper
deduction, credit, or basis, the statute provides an additional limita-
tion on relief that is tied to the innocent spouse's adjusted gross in-
come. 7 If the innocent spouse's adjusted gross income for the
preadjustment year5" is $20,000 or less, then relief from joint liability
will be available only if the liability described in section 6013(e) also
exceeds ten percent of such spouse's adjusted gross income.59 If the
innocent spouse's adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year is
greater than $20,000, then the additional limitation for relief is in-
creased from ten percent of such spouse's adjusted gross income to
twenty-five percent of such adjusted gross income.6 °
From a policy and fairness viewpoint, these additional limita-
tions are particularly troublesome. If the innocent spouse is married
to another spouse at the close of the preadjustment year, the innocent
spouse's adjusted gross income includes the income of the new spouse
regardless of whether or not they file a joint return. This appears to
fly in the face of the purpose for which the statute was originally en-
53. See Fields v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,653 (1981).
54. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2
at 1502, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 697, 1143.
55. See supra notes 29-32. It does not follow that because deductions lacking in a factual
or legal basis will be disallowed, all deductions which are disallowed lack a factual or legal
basis. A taxpayer may not rely on the disallowance or inability to substantiate a deduction to
prove a lack of basis in fact or law. Neary v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,261 (1985).
56. See Borison, supra note 3.
57. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) (1986). If the spouse is married to another spouse at the close of
the preadjustment year, the spouse's adjusted gross income shall include the income of the new
spouse, whether or not they file a joint return.
58. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(C) (1986) defines "preadjustment year" as the most recent taxable
year of the spouse ending before the date the deficiency notice is mailed.
59. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) (1986).
60. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(A) and (B) (1986).
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acted,6" and provides no inquiry into the available family income to
which the innocent spouse may have access for the payment of any
deficiency. Thus, an individual, otherwise eligible for innocent spouse
relief, may be denied relief by remarrying an individual who is finan-
cially successful.
To illustrate some of the problems created by these arbitrary lim-
itations, assume that a taxpayer is divorced from her husband who, in
prior years on their joint return and unknown to her, took erroneous
deductions for tax shelter investments that had no basis in fact or
law.6 2 Further, assume the taxpayer recently remarried, had little or
no personal income prior to her remarriage, signed the earlier joint
returns in complete reliance on her ex-husband's representations and
was generally eligible to qualify for innocent spouse relief under sec-
tion 6013(e). If her new husband has adjusted gross income for the
preadjustment year in excess of $20,000 and the assessed deficiency
does not exceed twenty-five percent of the couple's adjusted gross in-
come, 63 the innocent spouse will not qualify for relief under section
6013(e). Instead, she will be liable for the assessed deficiency, even
though all other requirements of the innocent spouse provision have
been satisfied. Additionally, the innocent spouse may have no per-
sonal income out of which to pay the assessed deficiency and her new
spouse may be financially unable for a number of reasons, 64 as well as
understandably reluctant, to assist the innocent spouse in paying a tax
deficiency generated solely by the innocent spouse's ex-husband. It
seems that this is exactly the type of inequity the statute was adopted
to prevent. The 1984 Tax Reform Act changes certainly represent a
liberalization of the original statute, 65 but these arbitrary limitations
may prevent relief from being granted in deserving situations.
61. See Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975), which stated that "Con-
gress intended the [innocent spouse] exception to remedy a perceived injustice, and we should
not hinder that praiseworthy intent by giving the exception an unduly narrow or restrictive
reading." Id. at 166-67.
62. This would not be an uncommon situation today as a result of the heavy investment in
tax shelters in the early 1980s. The use of such shelters, however, was significantly curtailed
by the passive activity loss limitations of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. See I.R.C. § 469 (1986)
and the regulations thereunder.
63. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(D) (1986).
64. For example, the new spouse may have adjusted gross income barely in excess of
$20,000 and be obligated under a court order to provide support to minor children of a previ-
ous marriage.
65. The recent amendments to § 6013(e) reflect a liberalization of the innocent spouse
provisions. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1502, reprinted in 1984 U.S.




The third requirement of the statute, which is the no knowledge
or reason to know of the understatement requirement, 66 is the most
litigated of the innocent spouse provisions and the most difficult for
the courts to consistently apply. 67 To satisfy this requirement, the
innocent spouse must establish that in signing the return he or she did
not know, and had no reason to know, that there was a substantial
understatement of tax.68 The lack of "actual knowledge" requirement
of the statute does not appear to be difficult for the courts to apply
and is determined on a facts and circumstances basis.69 If it is deter-
mined that a taxpayer had actual knowledge of the substantial under-
statement, inquiry into whether the section 6013(e)(1) requirements
have been met ends and innocent spouse relief will be denied.7" Even
if the taxpayer seeking relief can establish that he or she has no actual
knowledge of the understatement, the taxpayer still "must establish
that a reasonably prudent taxpayer, with his or her knowledge of fam-
ily finances, would have no reason to know of the omission."71
Section 6013(e) is designed to protect the innocent, not the inten-
tionally ignorant.72 As a result, courts have denied innocent spouse
relief where a spouse simply chooses not to know of the substantial
understatement. For example, in Schmidt v. United States, 73 the wife,
who had signed the joint return which omitted income, was denied
innocent spouse relief when she admitted she knew of the sale of two
pieces of properties at a gain. Her failure to review the tax return that
she signed could not satisfy the "no reason to know" requirement of
66. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1986).
67. See infra notes 94-162 and accompanying text.
68. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1986).
69. Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,478 (1985). Taxpayer's allegation
that he did not review the tax return for the taxable years at issue before the return was filed
was sufficient to prove lack of actual knowledge of the omissions from income during the
taxable years at issue. Id. at 2145. See also Moskovitz v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
86,357 (1986). Section 6013(e) relieves a spouse who signs a joint tax return of the tax liability
from the joint return from income earned by the other spouse without knowledge of the first
spouse. Ketchum v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
70. Swofford v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,148 (1975).
71. Estate of Jackson v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 356, 361 (1979). See also Panny and
Faust, supra note 15.
72. See Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,478 at 2145 (1986). Further,
where lack of knowledge of the taxpayer claiming innocent spouse relief is predicated on igno-
rance of the legal tax consequences of a transaction, § 6013(e) will not abate joint and several
tax liability in such instances. See Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824, 838 (1985); Trim-
mer v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,131 (1983); Smith v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 651,
673 (1978); Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 223, 230 (1974), aff'd 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir.
1975); McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972).
73. 5 Cf. Ct. 24 (1984).
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the statute when she knew about the existence of the income that her
husband did not report on the return.74
The final condition that must be satisfied for a taxpayer to qualify
for innocent spouse relief is that after taking into account all the facts
and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold such taxpayer lia-
ble for the deficiency in tax that is attributable to the substantial un-
derstatement of the other spouse. 75  This represents a change from
pre-1984 law as there is no longer any statutory inquiry into whether
the innocent spouse benefitted from the understatement. Supposedly,
the focus now is solely on whether imposing the tax would be inequi-
table under all the facts and circumstances.76 Even though there is no
longer a specific statutory inquiry into whether a taxpayer "signifi-
cantly benefitted" from the substantial understatement of income 7 7 it
is the primary factor that courts consider in determining whether it
would be inequitable to impose liability on the "innocent spouse" for
the payment of the deficiency.78
The determination of whether it would be "inequitable" to im-
pose the tax on the spouse claiming innocent spouse relief has
spawned much litigation,79 with the decisions generally turning on
whether the court finds that the level of benefits received by the "in-
nocent spouse" were significant.8 0 In Schmidt v. United States8' the
court determined that it would not be inequitable to hold the wife
liable for her share of the tax deficiency when it found that she signifi-
cantly benefitted from the proceeds from the sales of property omitted
74. Id. at 27. See also Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1170 (1979). Failure to
review a tax return, standing alone, does not relieve a taxpayer of liability for any subsequent
deficiency. Altman v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1973).
75. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1986).
76. Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-
5(b) (1974).
77. Section 6013(e)(1), prior to its amendment in 1984, explicitly required that a court
consider "whether or not the other spouse significantly benefitted directly or indirectly from
the items omitted from gross income" to determine if innocent spouse relief was warranted.
Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,278 at 1247 n.3 (1985).
78. See Hinds v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 88,426 (1988); Estate of Cardulla v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986); Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H)
85,278 (1985).
79. See Clevenger v. Commissioner, 826 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1987); Lessinger v. Commis-
sioner, 85 T.C. 824 (1985); Ballard v. Commissioner, 740 F.2d 659 (1984); Macaux v. Com-
missioner, 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,664 (1983).
80. Normal support is not a significant benefit for purposes of this determination. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6013-5(b) (1974). See also Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H)
86,307 (1986); Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1172-73 (1979); Mysse v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698-99 (1972).
81. 5 Cl. Ct. 24 (1984).
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from gross income. The wife received over $37,000 from the sale of
one of the properties acquired by her husband. With these proceeds,
she paid her children's college and law school tuitions, which she had
no obligation to pay. In addition, she used the proceeds to purchase
two pieces of real estate. While recognizing the well-established prin-
ciple that normal support is not a significant benefit,8 2 the court held
that the transfer of property traceable to omitted income was evidence
of a benefit, and also determined that the benefits received by the tax-
payer were significant.83
In Clevenger v. Commissioner84 the court denied innocent spouse
relief when it learned that the omitted income was used to make im-
provements to property owned jointly by the taxpayer and his wife.
Pursuant to their divorce decree, the taxpayer also received his wife's
interest in the corporations that they had owned jointly as well as
their personal residence. On these facts, the Tax Court found that it
would not be inequitable to hold the husband liable for the deficien-
cies as it found that he significantly benefitted from the omitted
income.85
Another factor that is considered in determining whether it
would be inequitable to impose the tax on the innocent spouse is the
degree of control that one spouse has over the family finances.86 The
marital status of the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief is another
factor to be considered in determining whether it would be inequitable
to hold such spouse liable for any deficiency.8" Although the courts
have considered these factors in making this "inequitable" determina-
tion,8 8 it appears that they are principally applied in the context of
whether a "significant benefit" was received by the innocent spouse.89
82. Id. at 28.
83. Id. The court, in reaching its decision, relied on the language of Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-
5(b) (1974), which provides that "[i]n making such a determination a factor to be considered is
whether the person seeking relief significantly benefitted, directly or indirectly, from the items
omitted from gross income." Id.
84. 826 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1987).
85. In fact, the court concluded that it would be inequitable not to hold the taxpayer liable
since his property was improved and he knew or should have known "that something was
rotten in Denmark." Id. at 1382.
86. Moskovitz v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357 (1986).
87. See S. REP. No. 1537, 91st Cong. (1970), reprinted in 1971-1 C.B. 606, 608. See also
Quint v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,226 (1985), where the court refused to deny
innocent spouse relief simply because the petitioner was still married to her husband. Id. at
1006.
88. See Quint v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,226 (1985).
89. In Moskovitz v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357 (1986), the court concluded
that innocent spouse relief should be granted to the taxpayer where his spouse had exclusive
control over family finances, was able to pay her creditors, and otherwise make use of the ill-
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In reviewing cases that have addressed this issue,9° it is not clear
what level of benefits received by an individual will result in a deter-
mination that significant benefits have been received by a taxpayer
seeking innocent spouse relief. In some cases the benefits received by
the innocent spouse appear quite significant, yet courts liberally ap-
plying the remedial provisions of the statute have granted innocent
spouse relief.9' This lack of consistency undermines the certainty of
the statute's applicability today. 92
III. WHAT IS THE JUDICIAL GLOSS ON THE REQUIREMENTS TO
OBTAIN RELIEF?
A. Have the Courts Articulated Standards for Taxpayers to Avail
Themselves of this Provision?
Taxpayers seeking innocent spouse relief must establish that they
have satisfied all four of the statutory requirements of section
6013(e)(1). 93 Taxpayers generally have little difficulty determining
whether the first two requirements of the statute, the filing of a joint
return and the substantial understatement of liability due to grossly
erroneous items, have been satisfied.94 In regard to the no knowledge
or reason to know and inequitable requirements as set forth in section
6013(e)(1)(C) and (D), respectively, taxpayers must look to caselaw to
determine if these requirements have been met.
First, in determining whether a spouse knew or should have
known of the substantial understatement,95 the standard applied is
whether a reasonable person under the circumstances of the taxpayer
at the time of the signing of the return could be expected to know of
its existence.
96
There are three factors that courts routinely consider in deter-
gotten funds in any way she desired. After analyzing the degree of control by the wife, the
court concluded that the husband did not benefit in any significant manner from the money his
wife embezzled and failed to report during the years in issue. Id. at 1625-26.
90. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Estate of Cardulla v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986).
92. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 25.
94. See Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228 (1986); Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M.
(P-H) 85,478 (1985); Cadwell v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,231 (1982), for analy-
sis of I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(A) and (B) (1986), respectively.
95. See supra note 26.
96. Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1170 (1979). See also Sanders v. United
States, 509 F.2d 162, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1975), which articulated the standard as to what a
reasonably prudent person would or should know in the circumstances, keeping in mind such
person's level of intelligence, education, and experience.
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mining whether a taxpayer had reason to know of the substantial un-
derstatement of tax.97 The first factor is the innocent spouse's degree
of participation in the business affairs or bookkeeping of the other
spouse.98 The second factor is the existence of unusual or lavish ex-
penditures during the year in issue.99 The third factor is the guilty
spouse's refusal to be forthright with the innocent spouse concerning
the couple's income-" Although these clearly articulated factors
have evolved through caselaw, the differing application of these prin-
ciples has made it difficult for taxpayers to determine whether they
qualify for innocent spouse relief.
Second, courts have fashioned a standard for determining
whether it would be inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable for
the substantial understatement of tax.'' However, it too has been
inconsistently applied, and it is addressed in more detail below. 102
B. Is Consistency the Hobgoblin of a Small Mind?
The lack of consistency in applying the "no reason to know"'0 3
and the "inequitable' requirements of the statute appears to be a
function of how liberally the courts considering these issues have ap-
plied the statute. Close scrutiny of the cases illustrates how difficult it
may be for taxpayers to determine if their particular situation satisfies
these latter two requirements of the statute. By failing to consistently
interpret and apply the law, the courts created a "hobgoblin"-a state
of uncertainty as to what factual circumstances will satisfy the latter
two requirements of the statute. As the cases will demonstrate, the
concept of consistency does not appear to be simply attributable to
the small-mindedness of a taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief, but
rather is a trait the courts need to develop for this statute to have
viability in the future as a remedial provision.
To illustrate this problem of inconsistent application of similar
97. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1975); Dickey v. Commissioner,
54 T.C.M. (P-H) $ 85,478 (1985); Walker v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,278 (1985);
Estate of Vella, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 (1982).
98. Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 223 (1974), aff'd 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975); Es-
tate of Cardulla, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986).
99. Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 699 (1972); Moskovitz v. Commissioner, 55
T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357 (1986).
100. Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303(1973); Dickey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M.
(P-H) 85,478 (1985).
101. See supra note 79.
102. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1986); see also infra notes 163-69.
103. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1986).
104. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1986).
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standards, four cases in which the "no reason to know" standard was
not met will be compared to four cases in which the standard was
determined to be satisfied. The lack of consistency is quite apparent.
In Schmidt v. United States "o the court held that the "no reason to
know" standard was not satisfied where the taxpayer admitted that
although she did not review the tax return when she signed it, she
knew about the existence of income that her husband omitted from
their joint return. In Schmidt the Claims Court determined that mere
knowledge of the existence of income was enough to put her on notice
that she should have known of the omission of gross income from the
return, even though she did not review the return in question. °6
Another case in which the "no reason to know" requirement was
not met is Trimmer v. Commissioner. °7 In Trimmer the taxpayer
learned of his wife's illegal activities' in July 1978 when she in-
formed him of her discharge from her job and the reasons behind the
discharge. By October 1978 his wife began serving a prison sentence
for stealing. The court found that because the husband had only a
seventh grade education, he knew very little about financial matters
and relied on his wife to handle their affairs. I 9 He signed their joint
return for 1978 in 1979, after he became aware of his wife's illegal
activities."0 Based upon this series of events, the court found that
there were sufficient facts within the husband's knowledge, at the time
he signed the return, to provide a reasonably prudent taxpayer with
reason to know of the omission of the embezzled income.
105. 5 Cl. Ct. 24 (1984).
106. Id. A taxpayer's failure to review her tax return cannot satisfy § 6013(e)(1)(B) (this is
pre-1984 TRA cite) when the taxpayer knew about the income which was not reported on the
return. Id. at 27. See also Altman v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1973); Terzian
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1170-71 (1979).
107. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,131 (1983).
108. Taxpayer's wife had embezzled funds from her employer during the years 1976, 1977,
and 1978. Id. at 503.
109. Id. at 503-04.
110. Id. at 504. The court further found that prior to the taxpayer's wife's incarceration,
she had handled the business matters in the taxpayer's home, including writing checks, paying
bills, and accumulating information necessary for the preparation of their joint tax returns,
which were customarily prepared by H & R Block. The 1978 joint return was also prepared by
H & R Block. Since the taxpayer's spouse was incarcerated when the 1978 return was pre-
pared, he simply supplied the preparer with information that he had obtained from an envel-
ope maintained by his wife prior to her incarceration. The taxpayer did not mention his wife's
embezzlement to the preparer, and the amount embezzled by the taxpayer's wife was not re-
ported on the return. Id.
11. Id. The court further stated that neither the taxpayer's ignorance of the law, nor his
lack of actual knowledge of the exact amount embezzled by his wife was sufficient to relieve
him of liability for the tax. Id. See also Anderson v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (P-H) 75,104
(1975).
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Although Trimmer arguably results in harsh consequences to the tax-
payer, particularly in view of his very limited education and complete
reliance on his wife to handle their financial affairs, the court strictly
construed the "no reason to know" requirement of the statute in de-
nying innocent spouse relief.' 
1 2
Shea v. Commissioner113 is another instance in which innocent
spouse relief was denied because the statutory "no reason to know"
requirement was not met. The court found that the taxpayer had the
relevant financial records available" 4 and was aware that her husband
was making unauthorized use of her bank account. The taxpayer
knew of her husband's drinking problems and deteriorating condition
during the years in question and had reason to suspect his inability to
properly handle financial matters. Further, the court found that she
was at least marginally involved in her husband's business and was
familiar with his expense payment procedure." 5 Under these circum-
stances, the court concluded that a prudent taxpayer would have at
least inquired into her personal financial and tax situation, thereby
discovering the omissions." 6 The court found that she made no such
effort and held that her failure to know of omissions on the tax return
resulted from her own lack of prudence." 7 The court concluded that
112. As the taxpayer knew of his wife's embezzlement of funds from her employer, this was
sufficient to provide a reasonably prudent taxpayer with reason to know of the omitted embez-
zlement income. 52 T.C.M. (P-H) 83,131 at 505. A taxpayer's lack of knowledge of the
effect of filing a joint return is of no moment as such knowledge of the law will be imputed to
him. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
113. 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. Taxpayer was the secretary-treasurer and a shareholder of her husband's corpora-
tion. She was authorized to write checks on, and make deposits to, the corporation's business
account and did so at her husband's direction, even though her husband was the only person to
examine the corporation's financial statements. Id. at 566.
115. Id. The taxpayer was authorized to and did draw checks on the corporate bank ac-
count. She also made bank deposits, answered the telephone, and performed other routine
tasks. Participation in a spouse's business affairs has commonly been held to negate an inno-
cent spouse claim. Id. See, e.g., Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 223 (1974), aff'd 524 F.2d
617 (7th Cir. 1975); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
116. 780 F.2d at 566. The court further stated that only minimal effort would have been
required by the taxpayer to open her bank statements and reconcile her checking account, to
secure her personal checks in a location not accessible to her husband, to question the purpose
for which she was told to issue or receive checks on the account of her husband's business, or
to contact her attorney to request information as to the filing of her annual tax returns. Id.
117. Id. "The petitioner does not make a showing that her husband's financial affairs were
unreasonably complex, see, e.g., Sanders, 509 F.2d at 166, 169-70, nor does she provide the
court with convincing reasons for not reviewing her own bank statements, which is certainly
her statutory duty as a bank customer. OHIo REV. CODE § 1304.29." 780 F.2d at 566-67
(footnotes omitted).
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the taxpayer had reason to know of the omissions and opportunity to
easily discover them.
The taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief in Shea was held to a
very high "no reason to know" standard. The court stated that the
taxpayer should have: (1) inquired into her personal financial and tax
situation; (2) reviewed and reconciled her bank statements; and
(3) made more of an effort to determine if her husband had omitted
income from their returns. The amount of effort required of the tax-
payer in Shea has no genesis in the statute"' and is inconsistent with
cases with similar factual situations.' 19
In Shapiro v. Commissioner 121 the court observed that the tax-
payer seeking innocent spouse relief was an intelligent, mature, edu-
cated woman with a college degree. 121  She testified that at her
husband's request, she served as an officer and director of his various
business enterprises. However, she performed no services for any of
these enterprises and knew nothing about the activities in which they
were engaged. She signed the joint return for the year in issue with-
out taking account of its contents or making any inquiry about it.
122
In denying innocent spouse relief, the court held her to a very
high "no reason to know" standard, stating that by signing corporate
returns, minutes of meetings and other corporate documents as a di-
rector or officer, the taxpayer was representing to the world that the
matters stated in those documents were true and correct. 123 By sign-
ing those documents, the court determined that the taxpayer assumed
a responsibility which she could not abdicate.' 24 The court further
stated that although this taxpayer may in fact have had no actual
knowledge of irregularities in the return when she signed it, she could
not close her eyes to matters which would put her on notice that there
may have been unreported income in the tax return that she signed.
25
Although the taxpayer's standard of living was not lavish or extrava-
gant, the court felt that a person of normal intelligence would know
118. I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
119. See, e.g., Estate of Vella, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 (1982). See also infra notes 130-
34.
120. 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 (1986).
121. Id. at 621. The facts disclosed that the taxpayer had a college degree in French, which
does not necessarily equate to business acumen.
122. Id. at 622.
123. Id. at 623.
124. Id.
125. Id. See also Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1170 (1979); Adams v. Commis-




that the extremely modest income reported in the 1977 joint return,
and the returns for prior years, would not support the taxpayer, her
husband, and two children in the style in which they lived.' 26 The
court concluded that the very nominal income reported in the return
should have put her on notice that something was wrong. Although
she may have preferred not to know what was going on in her hus-
band's various enterprises, the court felt that she was on notice that
something was happening 127 and that she had a duty to inquire.
Applying the principles of this case, it appears that any taxpayer
who is a shareholder or who serves as an officer or director of a busi-
ness of the other spouse is held to a standard of inquiry knowledge for
purposes of satisfying the "no reason to know" requirement of the
statute. This conclusion is supported by the result reached in this
decision notwithstanding the innocent spouse's minimal level of in-
volvement in her husband's businesses.
128
A common underpinning present in these four cases is the court's
apparent expectation that the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief
should have taken some action to determine if there was a substantial
understatement of tax. The "no reason to know" standard was signif-
icantly heightened in Shea 129 when the court held that the taxpayer
not only had a duty to inquire into her husband's financial affairs, but
also to reconcile her checkbook to determine if there was a substantial
understatement of tax. In a perfect world with exemplary marriages
and excellent spousal communication, such a standard might be a via-
ble and realistic expectation. It certainly should be questioned, how-
ever, particularly in view of the statute's underlying policy, whether a
taxpayer should be held to such a high standard in order to satisfy the
"no reason to know" requirement of the statute. This heightened
standard requires every spouse in effect to audit his or her spouse's
business prior to signing any joint return. Such a standard is unrealis-
tic, impractical, and may undermine confidence in our self-assessing
system of taxation.
126. 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 at 623.
127. Id. Taxpayer had no money of her own and there was no evidence in the record that
her husband had any source of nontaxable funds which would have supported their lifestyle,
which included trips to Europe, Las Vegas, and the beach. Additionally, the taxpayer served
as an officer or director in two of her husband's organizations which were the sources of sub-
stantial income which was unreported. Id.
128. Id. Aside from signing corporate documents and returns for one or more of her hus-
band's organizations, the taxpayer performed no services for any of her husband's businesses
and took no part in management. Nor did she investigate or make any inquiry concerning the
income or other business affairs of the various companies in which she held positions. Id.
129. 780 F.2d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1986).
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In contrast to the more strictly interpreted decisions discussed
above, set forth below are four cases in which the courts have more
liberally interpreted and applied the "no reason to know" requirement
of the statute. Although these decisions may be applauded by taxpay-
ers, close scrutiny of these cases in view of the four cases discussed
above illustrates the inconsistent application of the judicially articu-
lated standards for relief.
In Estate of Vella v. Commissioner"3 the court applied the stan-
dards set forth in Sanders v. United States'3 ' and granted innocent
spouse relief. The court found that the taxpayer's knowledge of her
husband's financial affairs was vague and that she did not know he
was skimming funds from his business operations. While the record
before the court did not establish that the husband was unusually se-
cretive about his finances, the court believed that he did not disclose
to his wife the extent of his holdings, many of which he had acquired
before their marriage. Further, although there were some expendi-
tures that might be deemed "lavish" for the couple's reported income,
the court determined that they were not so lavish as to have necessar-
ily aroused suspicion in the taxpayer's mind. The court then held that
the taxpayer's knowledge of her husband's sale of two businesses
would not have necessarily triggered suspicion in her mind that in-
come may have been omitted from the return when she was accus-
tomed to leaving all financial matters to her husband and her
accountant.' 32 The court further found that there was no evidence
that the taxpayer knew what amounts were received by her husband
from these sales. 133 The court concluded that although the taxpayer
130. 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 (1982).
131. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975). Three frequently considered factors from which a rea-
sonably prudent person would be expected to draw an inference that income was omitted from
the return are: (1) unusual or lavish expenditures by the family; (2) participation in business
affairs or bookkeeping; and (3) the refusal of the "guilty" spouse to be forthright about the
couple's income. Id. at 167.
132. 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 at 286-87. But see Schmidt v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 24
(1984) and supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text, where mere knowledge of the existence
of income was enough to put the innocent spouse on notice of income omission.
133. 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 at 288. The court further stated that a reasonably prudent
taxpayer, who had but scanty knowledge of her husband's financial dealings, who did not
know the amounts received through the transactions, and who left most financial details to her
husband, would not be put on notice of omissions from gross income in a year in which re-
ported income increased by over one-third. To the extent that the taxpayer thought of these
sales, the court stated that this increase in reported income could have allayed any suspicion.
Id. This result seems contrary to well-established caselaw. See Terzian v. Commissioner, 72
T.C, 1164 (1979) where the court declared that "[a] spouse cannot close ... [his] eyes to ...
facts that might give ... [him] reason to know of the unreported income." Id. at 1170 (citing
Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 699 (1972)).
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had some knowledge of the family finances and some incomplete in-
formation about her husband's investments, she did not know enough
to give her either actual knowledge or reason to know of the omitted
income. 134 It is interesting to note that although the taxpayer in Vella
had knowledge of the sale of two of her husband's businesses, unlike
the taxpayers in either Shea 131 or Shapiro,136 she was under no duty to
inquire into her husband's business affairs to determine if he had
omitted income from their return. This case is indistinguishable from
Shea or Shapiro since the innocent spouse in Vella had as much or
more of a reason to know of the existence of income. Yet the Vella
court found that the "no reason to know" requirement of section
6013(e) was satisfied. This case is particularly difficult to reconcile
with Schmidt where the Claims Court held that mere knowledge of
the existence of income was enough to put the innocent spouse on
notice of the omission. 137
In Ballard v. Commissioner 38 the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals liberally applied the factors set forth in Sanders v. United
States 139 to determine that the innocent spouse satisfied the "no rea-
son to know" requirement. The Tax Court rested its decision"' ° upon
the taxpayer's testimony that she knew her husband was in the scrap
iron and auto parts business during 1969 and 1970, even though his
company was not mentioned on their returns or attachments to the
returns for the years in question. The Tax Court focused on the fact
that the taxpayer endorsed some checks in 1969 that were made out
to her husband's business, thus corroborating the taxpayer's aware-
ness of that business.
Although knowledge of the existence of similar items in other
cases has resulted in the "no reason to know" requirement not being
satisfied,' 4 ' the Eighth Circuit disagreed that the factors relied on by
the Tax Court gave the taxpayer knowledge or reason to know that
her husband had omitted gross income from their 1969 and 1970 re-
turns. The Eighth Circuit relied heavily upon the taxpayer's uncon-
tradicted testimony that she had no involvement in the preparation of
the 1969 and 1970 tax returns, and merely signed them at her hus-
134. 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,073 at 288.
135. 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986).
136. 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 (1986).
137. See 5 CI. Ct. 24 (1984). See also supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
138. 740 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1984).
139. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975); see supra note 131.
140. 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,466 (1982).




band's request.'42 Although the court viewed such a practice as un-
wise, the court found that her testimony established that she did not
know of any omissions of gross income on the returns, nor did she
have any reason to know of the omissions.'43 The record contained
no evidence of unusual expenditures by the Ballards, of the wife par-
ticipating in or keeping the books of her husband's business, or of any
evasiveness by the husband in explaining his income to his wife-fac-
tors which courts have relief on to put a taxpayer on notice that her or
his spouse was concealing income from the government."' 4 Because
there was much overlap in the husband's various business activities,
the court found that the taxpayer reasonably could have concluded
that the husband's business was not mentioned in their 1969 and 1970
returns (even though checks made out to the company were received
in 1969), because the business was so interrelated with other busi-
nesses of the husband, because the husband's scrap iron business oper-
ated at a loss during these years, or because the profits of the business
were included in husband's wages from another employer which were
reported. "I
The court appears to be creating alternative circumstances under
which the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief may satisfy the "no
reason to know" requirement of the statute. More incredibly, the
court found that the innocent spouse met her burden of proving this
requirement, notwithstanding the fact that she endorsed checks made
out to her husband's business reflecting income that was omitted, and
acknowledged that she was aware of the existence of the income that
was omitted from the return. 46 This is an extremely broad applica-
tion of this statute. In view of this decision, taxpayers in the Eighth
Circuit should question to what extent, if any, they have a duty to
inquire into their spouses' financial affairs.
Another decision liberally applying the "no reason to know" re-
quirement was Ratner v. Commissioner. "47 In Ratner the court had
no difficulty determining that the wife had no actual knowledge of the
omission. 48 In finding that the taxpayer had no reason to know, the
142. 740 F.2d at 664.
143. Id.
144. Id. See also Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 167-68 nn.15-17 (5th Cir. 1975);
Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 381-83 (1971).
145. 740 F.2d at 664.
146. But see Shapiro v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 (1986); Dickey v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,478 (1985).
147. 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,333 (1981).
148. Id. at 1178. The taxpayer was embarrassed by her husband's pornographic business
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court applied the three factors set forth in Sanders. '4 9 First, the court
found no evidence of unusual or lavish expenditures. 15 Second, the
court found that the taxpayer had no training in bookkeeping or busi-
ness. Although the taxpayer wrote checks, she did not keep a running
balance in the checkbook or reconcile the monthly bank state-
ments.' 5 Except for the normal business transactions of a housewife,
the court found that all of her bank transactions were conducted
under the direction of her husband. Finally, as to the application of
the third factor, 52 the court found that the husband never discussed
the details of his business with his wife.
153
A final case illustrating the inconsistent application of the "no
reason to know" requirement is Johnson v. Commissioner, ' which
involved a wife's scheme to defraud her employer. Once again, the
court had no difficulty finding that the taxpayer seeking innocent
spouse relief had no actual knowledge of the omitted funds. 5 ' The
taxpayer knew that his wife routinely handled checks for her em-
ployer. The court found that the innocent spouse's wife never dis-
closed her misappropriation of checks to him, and in fact, took
various steps to conceal her illegal activities from him. The court
concluded that the taxpayer's limited participation in his wife's
scheme to defraud her employer (endorsing and cashing checks)
would not necessarily have given him actual knowledge of the omitted
income.' 56 The court further determined that the innocent spouse
had no reason to know of the omitted income. Although the court
recognized that there was a disparity between the family's total ex-
and the IRS virtually conceded that the taxpayer did not have actual knowledge of the omis-
sion of income from the joint return. Id.
149. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975); see supra note 131.
150. 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,333 at 1178. The taxpayer testified quite convincingly of her
family's modest standard of living. Id.
151. Id. But see Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986) and supra notes 113-
19 and accompanying text, where the court required the taxpayer to reconcile monthly bank
statements in order to satisfy the "no reason to know" requirement.
152. The third factor in Sanders is the guilty spouse's refusal to be forthright concerning
the couple's income.
153. 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,333 at 1178-79. The husband controlled all of the family finan-
cial decisions and completely dominated his wife. The court also found that the husband led
her to believe that some of the money being transferred among the accounts came from loans
or gifts from members of husband's family. Id. These findings are anomalous.
154. 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,569 (1980).
155. Id. at 2408. Although the taxpayer endorsed and cashed 18 misappropriated checks
for his wife, the court was convinced that the taxpayer did not know those checks were stolen
or that his wife had forged the physicians' signatures.
156. Id. Both the taxpayer and his wife testified that the taxpayer was not aware of the
misappropriation when he signed the joint return.
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penditures and their reported income for the years in question, it held
that this disparity did not necessarily indicate that the taxpayer
should have known of the omitted income. 5 7 Applying the Sanders
factors, 58 the court concluded that the taxpayer had no reason to
know of the omission from gross income, 15' even though the taxpayer
had cashed checks for his wife that she embezzled, there was a dis-
crepancy between their total expenditures and family income, and the
taxpayer knew his wife was going to the police station to give state-
ments. Although the husband was aware of certain matters about
which a reasonably prudent taxpayer might question, 60 this court did
not impose any duty on the innocent spouse to inquire into his wife's
business affairs. 161
As the cases discussed above illustrate, it would be unwise for an
individual seeking innocent spouse relief to rely too heavily on any
one case to establish that such taxpayer had satisfied the "no reason to
know" requirement of the statute. The unpredictable and inconsis-
tent application of judicially created standards has cast a shadow over
the usefulness of this statute to taxpayers, particularly in view of the
expense of litigation. However, this uncertainty is a double-edged
157. Id. at 2409. The wife testified that her husband was financially unsophisticated and
trusted her to handle these matters. The wife paid the bills, managed the checking account,
made most of the purchases, etc. When the court considered the wife's total dominance of the
family's financial affairs and the fact that their standard of living remained substantially un-
changed, the court believed that the taxpayer had no reason to suspect the existence of any
unreported income. The court reached the same conclusion regarding each of the misappro-
priated checks cashed by the taxpayer which were made payable to the wife's employer. The
taxpayer cashed these checks at his wife's request and returned the cash to his wife, who
informed him that she would take the cash back to her office. The court further found that
although taxpayer was aware of his wife's appearance at the police station in 1975, he did not
know the reason for her appearance or the contents of her statement. The court believed that
prior to March of 1976, the taxpayer did not know either the specific reasons for his wife's
appearances or the contents of her statement. Id.
158. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
159. Johnson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,569, 2406, 2410 (1980). First, the
record showed that the misappropriated funds were used primarily for groceries, house pay-
ments, bills, furniture, and other minor living expenses. These expenditures were in the nature
of ordinary support and would not normally give a spouse reason to know of the omitted
income. Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698 (1972). There was no evidence of any
lavish or extraordinary expenditures which would have put the taxpayer on notice of the unre-
ported income. Cf Estate of Jackson, 72 T.C. 356 (1979). Second, the court noted that the
taxpayer did not participate in the family's financial affairs, nor was he involved in keeping
books and records. Compare Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 223 (1974), aff'd, 524 F.2d 617
(7th Cir. 1975), with Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979).
160. For example, why was his wife going to the police station to give statements, or what
was the reason for the discrepancy in family income?
161. Contra Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1986); Schmidt v. United States,
5 Cl. Ct. 24 (1984); Shapiro v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 (1986).
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sword-it could prove useful to a taxpayer who is willing to settle this
issue with the IRS prior to litigation. Those individuals who are more
vehement about challenging the liability their spouse, or ex-spouse,
has created for them, should proceed cautiously toward trial. An in-
dividual's greatest chance of satisfying the "no reason to know" re-
quirement of the statute may depend on whether the judge is
predisposed to apply the remedial purpose of this statute liberally.
162
As noted previously, the courts have also lacked consistency in
the application of the requirement that it not be inequitable to hold
the innocent spouse liable for the deficiency attributable to the other
spouse. 163 A cursory review of a few cases illustrates this point. In
Clevenger v. Commissioner"6 the court held it would not be inequita-
ble to hold the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief liable where
she received her husband's interest in two corporations and their per-
sonal residence, which had been acquired and maintained with the
omitted income. 1
65
Other cases, however, wherein the taxpayer received seemingly
as much or more benefit as the taxpayer in Clevenger, have arrived at
different results. For example, in Estate of Cardulla v. Commis-
sioner, 166 the court granted innocent spouse relief where the first three
requirements of the statute were satisfied. The court then determined
it would be inequitable to hold the wife liable for the assessed defi-
ciency even though some of the husband's bank accounts were in the
wife's name, as well as certain other assets, including a New York city
bond, a California ranch, and an apartment building which were held
jointly by the taxpayer and her husband.' 67 The court's rationale for
this conclusion was that the benefits received by the taxpayer were
more in the nature of ordinary support. Also, in light of the 1984
changes in the statute, the court apparently viewed the benefits re-
ceived by the taxpayer as so incidental that it felt it would be inequita-
162. If the taxpayer's forum for litigation is federal district court, the predisposition of the
judge may not be as important if the taxpayer requests a jury trial.
163. For a general discussion of this requirement, see supra notes 74-92 and accompanying
text.
164. 826 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir. 1987).
165. Id. at 1382. See also Durkee v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,475 (1981) (the
taxpayer significantly and directly benefited from some of the money that her husband omitted
from gross income since at least a portion of these funds were used as part of a downpayment
on a farm titled in taxpayer's name); Estate of Gryder v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 336 (1983)
(the innocent spouse received title to a considerable amount of property purchased with funds
from her husband's business which were not reported as income; it did not matter to the court
that the innocent spouse had received such property by devise and inheritance).
166. 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986).
167. Id. at 1345.
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ble to impose liability on the wife. The Cardulla decision is a very
favorable interpretation for taxpayers, as the omitted income clearly
appears to have been used to acquire assets well beyond a normal level
of support.' 68
Although inconsistency by the courts in applying the "inequita-
ble" requirement of section 6013(e)(1)(D) is not as prevalent as in the
"no reason to know" requirement of the statute, it is far from clear
when a court will consider it inequitable to impose liability on an in-
nocent spouse. Cases such as Cardulla 169 may be helpful for taxpay-
ers attempting to settle an innocent spouse controversy with the
Service, but the likelihood of courts giving much weight to that deci-
sion is uncertain, particularly in view of the significant amount of as-
sets the innocent spouse received.
IV. CHANGES ENACTED UNDER THE TECHNICAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE ACT OF 1988-A STEP IN
THE WRONG DIRECTION
In 1988 Congress enacted a transitional rule to provide addi-
tional relief under the innocent spouse provision in very limited situa-
tions. 70 Generally, this amendment applies if: (1) on a joint return
filed before January 1, 1985, there was an understatement attributable
to disallowed deductions of the other spouse the amount of which
exceeded the taxable income shown on the return; (2) the innocent
spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know
(or have reason to know) that there was such an understatement;
(3) the marriage terminated; and (4) the net worth of the innocent
spouse immediately following the termination of the marriage was less
than $10,000. If these conditions exist, then the innocent spouse is
relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and other
amounts) for the year to the extent the liability is attributable to the
understatement.' 7 ' The 1988 changes further provide that a refund
will be allowed notwithstanding any other law, or rule of law, if a
168. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,569 (1980), where the court
found that the husband had used the funds misappropriated by his wife which she had omitted
from gross income for groceries, bills, and other items of ordinary support for the family. To
this extent, he did not significantly benefit from the omitted income. See also Moskovitz v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,357 (1986); Quint v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H)
85,226 (1985).
169. 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,307 (1986).
170. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6004, 102
Stat. 3685 (1988). These changes apply with respect to joint returns filed before January 1,




refund claim is filed within one year of the date of enactment. 172
Although these amendments broaden the innocent spouse relief
available under the statute, albeit in very limited circumstances, such
changes are a step in the wrong direction for several reasons. First,
the relief is available only for taxable years before 1985. It does not
provide similar relief for taxpayers in identical situations after
1984.173
Second, the transition rule only applies if the understatement at-
tributable to disallowed deductions of the other spouse exceeds the
taxable income on the return. This condition is so narrowly drafted
that it is difficult to imagine much applicability other than in an in-
stance where the taxpayer's ex-spouse is financially well off and has
disallowed deductions that exceed the taxable income on their joint
return. Lower income taxpayers will be less likely to utilize this pro-
vision as they generally will not be in a position to take deductions
that, when subsequently disallowed, exceed the taxable income shown
on their return. A remedial provision that appears to favor an inno-
cent spouse whose ex-spouse had above average earnings should be
questioned.
Third, the $10,000 net worth figure selected as the benchmark
for providing relief under this transition rule is another example of the
arbitrariness of this statute. It is difficult to imagine any situation in
which an otherwise qualifying innocent spouse with a net worth of
$10,001 is any less deserving of relief than an innocent spouse with a
net worth of $9999. This is yet another example of this statute setting
an arbitrary limitation on the availability of relief for spouses who are
otherwise just as deserving of relief as those who happen to fall within
its artificial parameters. 
74
Finally, the marital status of a spouse seeking innocent spouse
relief should not be a determining factor in granting relief under this
transitional rule if the other requirements of the statute are satisfied.
Merely because an innocent spouse remains married should not result
172. Id. No interest is payable, however, for any period prior to the date of enactment,
which is November 10, 1988.
173. Although the Tax Reform Act of 1984 extends innocent spouse relief to disallowed
deductions for post-1984 years, an individual in 1985 and thereafter who meets the require-
ments of the special transition ruled enacted in Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6004, 102 Stat. 3685 (1988), but fails the applicable gross income
limitation test of I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) will be ineligible for innocent spouse relief. This is partic-
ularly harsh if the individual seeking innocent spouse relief only fails the gross income test
because of her new spouse's income being included in her income under I.R.C.
§ 6013(e)(4)(D).
174. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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in a denial of relief if the circumstances otherwise justify such treat-
ment. There is no basis for treating innocent spouses who are di-
vorced more favorably than those who remain married. The existence
of a marriage should not eliminate the availability of relief, particu-
larly in view of the numerous reasons why couples may or may not
-choose to remain married.
V. PROPOSALS FOR MODIFICATION AND REFORM
OF EXISTING LAW
Congress should eliminate the requirements of sections
6013(e)(4)(A) and (B), respectively, which condition the granting of
innocent spouse relief upon the understatement of tax exceeding a
specified percentage of the innocent spouse's income. Congress has
already eliminated this arbitrary requirement where the understate-
ment of tax is attributable to an omission of gross income from the
return.'75 It is difficult to understand why a spouse, who otherwise
meets all the requirements for relief, except that the understatement
of tax attributable to deductions that have no basis in fact or law does
not exceed an arbitrary percentage of such spouse's adjusted gross
income, should be denied relief, while another taxpayer in an identical
economic situation, but whose deficiency is based upon an omission of
gross income, would be entitled to relief. This seems to be a narrow-
ing of the remedial purpose for which the statute was enacted.
7 6
From both a fairness and an administrative tax policy standpoint,
Congress should provide similar standards for relief, regardless of
whether the substantial understatement of tax is attributable to an
omission from gross income or to a claimed deduction for which there
is no basis in fact or law.
If the proposed change suggested above is not made and a tax-
payer who may be eligible for innocent spouse relief subsequently re-
marries, Congress should modify the statute to exclude the new
spouse's income from the computation of the innocent spouse's ad-
justed gross income.' 77 This change would recognize the practicalities
of a multiple marriage society, would compute the adjusted gross in-
come limitations of the statute solely on the innocent spouse's income,
175. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(E) which excepts omissions from gross income from the appli-
cation of the limitations of § 6013(e)(4).
176. See supra note 59.
177. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4)(D) basically provides that if the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse
relief is married to another spouse at the close of the preadjustment year, the innocent spouse's




and would minimize the involvement of a new spouse who undoubt-
edly would prefer not to become embroiled in a tax controversy cre-
ated by his or her spouse's former mate. From a policy standpoint,
the statute may be viewed as discouraging subsequent marriages, at
least until the applicable statute of limitations for assessing deficien-
cies of the previous marriage expires, since the statute includes the
new spouse's income regardless of whether the taxpayer and new
spouse file a joint return.'78 From a tax planning perspective, a
couple may be well advised to live together until the statute of limita-
tions expires for assessing tax deficiencies of the prior marriage. The
effect of avoiding the applicability of this rule in second marriage situ-
ations is likely to be considered contrary to the values of a vast major-
ity of the taxpayers in this country and may not be the type of social
behavior our government wants to indirectly encourage through its
tax policy.
The final legislative change that should be made is the modifica-
tion of the provision recently enacted by Congress in 1988.179 This
limited transitional relief is too narrow in its scope. The underlying
policy for the statute is contrary to the conditioning of relief on the
ability of a taxpayer to satisfy such an arbitrary standard.
8
1
Although this recent legislation might provide relief to a deserving
innocent spouse who might not otherwise qualify for relief,'8 ' the pro-
vision should be modified to address the concerns raised above.' 82
The remaining area for reform would be a call for courts decid-
ing innocent spouse cases to apply the standards for relief more con-
sistently and liberally. Where innocent spouse relief depends on a
strict versus liberal application of the statute, the vagaries of each
court may cause taxpayers to lose confidence in our system of ad-
ministering the tax laws, and result in an unwillingness to voluntarily
comply with them. The underlying policy suggesting a liberal appli-
cation of the statute to remedy a perceived injustice is quite clear,
8 3
and courts should be mindful of this policy when deciding these cases.
178. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(D) (1986).
179. See text accompanying note 170.
180. See supra note 12.
181. See supra notes 18-22. Prior to 1984, a taxpayer could not qualify for innocent spouse
relief if the understatement was not attributable to an omission of an item from gross income.
182. See supra notes 170-73.
183. See supra notes 13 and 50.
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VI. PLANNING FOR A CLIENT IN VIEW OF
SECTION 6013(e) TODAY
Generally, by the time a taxpayer is in a position to determine if
he or she qualifies for innocent spouse relief, there is not much that a
tax adviser can do for the years in issue. Initially, the tax adviser
should review any deficiency notices, the returns in question, and
learn as much about the circumstances of the preparation, signing,
and filing of the returns to see if there are any other grounds on which
the client may be relieved of liability for the assessed deficiency. 84 If
other grounds for relief exist, there will be no need to approach the
case from an innocent spouse posture.
If a client has moved since the filing of the returns for any open
years, or is divorced and living at an address other than that provided
on the return, the tax practitioner should advise the client to immedi-
ately send notice by registered or certified mail of the change of his or
her address to the IRS, and any appropriate state taxing authority, so
that any subsequently mailed deficiency notice to an old address will
not be sufficient notice by the Service. 85
If the tax liability assessed against the innocent spouse cannot be
dismissed on procedural grounds and the case proceeds towards trial,
it is imperative that the innocent spouse be willing to testify. A re-
view of the decided cases indicates that innocent spouse relief is gener-
ally not granted where the taxpayer is present, but fails to testify on
his or her own behalf. 1
86
Where a practitioner has the opportunity to consult with a tax-
payer before the taxpayer's upcoming marriage, particularly in the
second marriage context, it would be prudent to raise the conse-
quences of filing joint income tax returns with the new spouse.
Although the filing of separate returns by a client and his or her
spouse avoids the problems associated with establishing entitlement to
innocent spouse relief in the future, filing separately may exact a
price.' 7 Prior to advising a married client to file a separate return, a
184. For example, is the assessment time barred? See I.R.C. § 6501 (1986). Did the inno-
cent spouse actually sign the return in issue? See I.R.C. § 6061 (1986). Was the deficiency
notice properly addressed? See I.R.C. § 6212 (1986).
185. See I.R.C. § 6212(b)(2) (1986).
186. See Most v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,216 (1972); Ratner v. Commis-
sioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,333 (1981); Presley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 79,339
(1979); McManus v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (P-H) 72,200 (1972).
187. In addition to obvious differences based on filing status, such as the basic standard
deduction under I.R.C. § 63 and tax rates under I.R.C. § 1, there are less obvious considera-
tions. For example, under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, there is a limitation on the ability of
taxpayers to deduct losses from passive activities. Under I.R.C. § 469, there is a limited excep-
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thorough review of the taxpayer's tax situation should be performed
and full disclosure of all consequences should be made.
In view of decisions such as Shapiro,"" practitioners should be
very careful when advising both spouses in a family business context,
particularly where one spouse signs documents and returns in a minis-
terial or subservient capacity, to disclose the complete consequences
of signing such documents. This appears to be an area ripe for a con-
flict of interest claim against the practitioner, the likelihood of which
is increased where the culpable ex-spouse and business remain a client
of the adviser, and the innocent ex-spouse receives a deficiency
assessment.
Finally, when representing an individual in a divorce who has
little or no knowledge of the other spouse's financial affairs, the prac-
titioner should seek an indemnity for all subsequently assessed taxes
arising from the other spouse's financial activities during the marriage
in the property settlement agreement. Although not binding on the
Service, this will provide the innocent spouse with a contractual rem-
edy against the responsible ex-spouse in the event there is a subse-
quent assessment of joint liability which is attributable to the other
spouse's activities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the innocent spouse provision is not refuse
to be discarded. The statute still fills a gap resulting from the imposi-
tion of joint liability where couples file joint returns. However, the
statute needs legislative fine tuning and judicial liberalization and con-
sistency to fully realize the purposes for which it was enacted.
tion to the disallowance of passive activity losses for losses arising from the rental of residential
real estate. Subject to a phaseout for certain high income taxpayers, the first $25,000 of losses
from the rental of residential real estate may be used by a taxpayer to offset ordinary income
such as salary. However, if a taxpayer who can avail himself or herself of this limited excep-
tion is married and resides with such spouse for one day during the tax year, a joint return
must be filed or the taxpayer will completely lose the ability to utilize this potential benefit.
I.R.C. § 469(i)(5)(B) (1986).
188. See Shapiro v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 86,142 (1986); see also text accom-
panying note 120.
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